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Abstract: 
One feature of the European patent system that is heavily criticized nowadays is related to its 
complex fragmentation and the induced cost burden for applicants. Once a patent is granted by 
the EPO, the assignee must validate (and often translate) it and pay the renewal fees to keep it 
in force in each country in which the applicant seeks protection. The objective of this paper is 
to assess to what extent validation and renewal fees as well as translation costs affect the 
validation behavior of applicants. We rely on a gravity model that aims at explaining patent 
flows between inventor and target countries within the European patent system. The results 
show that the size of countries, their wealth and the distance between their capital cities are 
significant determinants of patent flows. Validation fees and renewal fees further affect the 
validation behavior of applicants. Translation costs seem to have an impact as well. The 
important role played by fees suggests that the implementation of cost-reducing policy 
interventions like the London Protocol would induce a significant increase in the number of 
patents validated in each European country. 
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1 Introduction 
 
At the creation of the European Patent Convention in 1977, the ultimate objective of the eight 
founding countries1 was to create a Community Patent - i.e., a patent that would be unique for 
all the member states, and automatically cover the whole geographical area, like in the U.S.. 
They, however, started with the creation of a European patent that was to be granted by the 
European Patent Office (EPO). The key characteristic of this system was that the granting 
process was centralized and standardized at the EPO. Once granted, however, the patent had 
to be effectively enforced in each member state of the EPC for which the applicant desired to 
have patent protection. To achieve this protection, the applicant had to validate (i.e., pay the 
validation fees) his or her patent at the national patent office of the respective state, pay the 
translation costs if required, and pay the renewal fees each consecutive year for which 
protection had to be maintained. 
 
Since then the European Patent Convention (EPC) has enjoyed a constant increase in its 
success, as witnessed by two key indicators. First, the number of patent applications at the 
EPO has nearly continuously increased, from a few thousands in the early eighties to more 
than 200,000 in 2006. Second, the number of member states has also been frequently 
leveraged, to reach 322 in 2007. In each of these countries, the applicant would have to 
undergo the process just described. Obviously, the post-grant European system is fragmented 
and complex. 
 
This complexity has triggered criticisms from the business sector and intense policy debates 
across Europe. The bone of contention, for about 30 years, is related to the costs induced by 
the geographical fragmentation – and hence the complexity - of the system. As clearly 
illustrated by van Pottelsberghe and François (2006), the total costs composed of national 
validation fees, national renewal fees, the frequent translations requirement, and the potential 
enforcement or litigation issues must be multiplied by the number of countries in which 
protection is sought. This fragmentation leads to a patent system that is much more expensive 
than in the USA or Japan in both absolute and relative terms.3 
                                            
1
  On October 7, 1977, the EPC entered into force for Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom and on May 1, 1978 Sweden joined the EPC, see 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html#contracting (accessed on July 19, 2007). 
2
  See Annex A.1 for a summary of the current members of the EPC.  
3
  van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) argue that for a proper international comparison of costs, the market 
size and the average number of claims of a patent must be taken into account. For instance, comparing 
 3 
 
High costs and complexity are a burden perceived by firms and other types of applicants, who 
regularly complain about it. At the same time, filing fees may be an appropriate instrument 
for patent offices to deter marginal patent applications. Any attempt of deterring minor 
applications would, however, depend on detailed knowledge as to how elastic the demand for 
patent applications is with respect to patenting costs. As shown by Peeters and van 
Pottelsberghe (2006) and Park (2003), there seems to be no causal relationship between firms’ 
perceptions of high patenting costs and their actual patenting behaviour. While some 
empirical evidence has been provided on the negative impact of filing and examination fees at 
national patent offices on patenting activity, there is so far no empirical evidence on the 
impact of validation fees and early renewal fees on the validation behaviours adopted by 
applicants.4 
 
The broader objective of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the determinants of 
validation behaviours adopted by applicants once their patent has been granted by the EPO. 
We focus on the role which national validation fees, early renewal fees and translation costs 
play in an applicant’s decision-making. Two specific research questions are investigated in 
this respect. First, to what extent do post-grant fees vary across the member states of the EPC? 
Second, do variations in these fees affect the validation behaviour of applicants? We hope that 
our answers to these research questions will matter for policy makers for three distinct 
reasons. First, the answers will provide additional insights into the effects of the 
fragmentation of the European patent system in the post-grant stage. Second, they can be used 
to effectively leverage patent fees to design a sound patent system. Third, as national patent 
offices are the recipients of these validations, the econometric results may help them to 
understand the factors that drive foreign applicants to seek or forego patent validation in their 
jurisdiction. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly describes the European patent 
system and the grant process at the EPO. Section 3 presents the gravity model, traditionally 
                                                                                                                                        
cumulated filing fees up to grant and translation costs for EP and US patent applications, they show that for 
an effective protection in 13 countries of the EPC, the cost per claim per capita is 10 times higher in Europe 
compared to the US.  
4
  de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2007) provide empirical evidence suggesting that filing and 
examination fees at 29 EPC national patent offices substantially affect the number of priority filings in these 
offices. van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) display graphical evidence suggesting that cumulated filing, 
examination fees and translation costs do affect the number of applications (second filings and priority 
filings) at three large patent offices (EPO, USPTO and JPO). 
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used to explain international trade flows, it is used here to explain validation behaviours (or 
patent flows) within the European patent system. The variables and data sources are described 
in Section 4. Section 5 contains the empirical results and our interpretation, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
2 Grant and Validation Procedure 
 
The European Patent Office (EPO) conducts the search, examination and grant procedures on 
behalf of the 32 (as of March 2007) contracting states to the European Patent Convention 
(EPC). An EP patent application must be filed in one of the official languages of the EPO, 
i.e., English, German or French, the so called procedural languages.5 The European granting 
procedure starts with a formality check, then a search report is drawn up containing all 
documents, or prior art, which could impede the patentability of the invention or describe the 
state of the art succinctly. The search report is generally published 18 months after the first 
filing (priority date) of the patent. The objective of the substantive examination is to check 
whether the invention meets the requirements of the EPC: novelty, inventive step, and 
industrial applicability. In case of a successful examination, the European patent is granted, 
often after some negotiation between examiner and applicant concerning the wording of 
claims and other elements of the application.6  
 
After grant, a European (EP) patent has to be converted into a national patent in each state for 
which protection is desired, then having the same legal status as patents granted in the 
respective national procedures.7 In general this validation process requires the filing of a 
translation of the patent specification and the payment of national validation/publication fees 
within a specified term. 
 
                                            
5
  Applicants from countries that do not have one of the EPO’s procedural languages as their official language 
can file the EP patent application in their own language. However, a translation into one of the three official 
languages must be submitted within three months. See http://www.epo.org/patents/Grant-procedure/Filing-an-
application.html (accessed on May 22, 2007). 
6
  In case the examination is not successful, the EPO refuses to grant the patent. The applicant has to keep a 
term of two months for filing an appeal against the decision of rejection. A large share, about 35%, of patent 
applications at the EPO are withdrawn by the applicants during the search and examination processes 
(Lazaridis / van Pottelsberghe, 2007).  
7
  See http://www.epo.org/patents/Grant-procedure/Filing-an-application/European-applications/national-
validation.html (accessed on May 22, 2007). 
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According to Art. 65(1) EPC 
"any contracting state can prescribe that if the text, in which the European Patent 
Office intends to grant a European patent or maintain a European patent as 
amended for that state, is not drawn up in one of its official languages, the 
applicant for or proprietor of the patent must supply to its central industrial 
property office a translation of this text in one of its official languages at his option 
or, where that state has prescribed the use of one specific official language, in that 
language". 
 
However, for those member states having English, French or German as official language, no 
validation is required for patents that have been granted in the official language of these 
countries:  
"… no action need to be taken by the patentee before the national patent 
authorities for the European patent to acquire that effect [the effect of a 
national patent validated in a contracting state], provided it was published by 
the EPO in a language prescribed by the state concerned pursuant to Article 
65(1) EPC or the state does not require a translation of the patent 
specification" (National Law Relating to the EPC, p. 95). 
 
From the third year after application, the applicant has to pay renewal fees. During the 
examination procedure renewal fees are paid to the EPO, Art. 86 (1), (3) EPC states: 
 
"Renewal fees shall be paid to the European Patent Office in accordance with the 
Implementing Regulations in respect of European patent applications. These fees 
shall be due in respect of the third year and each subsequent year, calculated from 
the date of filing of the application. ….. If the renewal fee and any additional fee 
have not been paid in due time the European patent application shall be deemed to 
be withdrawn". 
 
After grant, national renewal fees have to be paid in those states where the patent had been 
validated and is to be kept alive. In case the applicant fails to pay the renewal fees in due time, 
the patent is no longer in force. Finally, a patent expires at the latest 20 years after its 
application date.  
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Figure 1: Application and renewal procedure at the EPO for patent applications directly  
filed with the EPO 
 
The most important steps of the application and the validation procedure at the EPO, from the 
decision to file a patent at the EPO until the effective validation of this patent in several 
national patent offices, are summarized in Figure 1. The stages are intentionally simplified as 
the routes to the EPO are actually diverse (first filings, second filings, PCT applications).8 
The focus of our analysis is rather on the right-hand side of Figure 1. In particular, we try to 
answer the following questions: In which countries are granted patents generally validated? 
What are the broad factors that motivate this decision? And, in particular, is this choice also 
motivated by fees or translation costs? The next section presents the empirical model that is 
used to provide some answers to these questions. 
 
 
 
3 The Gravity Model 
The gravity model has become widely accepted in economics to predict bilateral trade flows 
between two destinations (e.g., Tinbergen (1962); Geraci and Prewo (1977); and Abrams 
(1980)) or to forecast migration and commuting between cities or countries (Karemera et al., 
                                            
8
  See Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for an in-depth description of filing procedures at the EPO. 
0 
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2000). The model has been derived from the 'Law of Gravity'9 developed by Isaac Newton in 
the 17th century. Generally, the log-linear equation quantifies different kinds of flows (most 
frequently trade flows) from country A to country B. These flows can be explained by 
economic forces of both countries (e.g., the GDP) and other factors supporting or impeding 
these flows (e.g., the distance between the two countries).  
 
Although the explanatory power of the gravity model has been recognized for long, scholars 
have continuously worked on finding stronger theoretical foundations (e.g., Linnemann 
(1966) and Bergstrand (1984)) as well as better econometric specifications (e.g., Matyas 
(1998) and Egger (2002)). For instance, Egger (2000) proposes to use a panel regression 
framework. Most notably, results show that the model can be improved by adding additional 
explanatory variables to further increase the explanatory power of the specification 
(Greenwood, 1975). A substantial step forward in the model specification was introduced by 
Bergstrand (1985). The author argues that the assumption of perfect product substitutability 
across countries does not hold. Therefore, to avoid a misspecification of the gravity model, 
prices have to be included as additional explanatory variables, and the author finds indeed that 
price terms derived from utility and production functions play a substantial role in explaining 
international trade flows. Additionally, Bergstrand (1985: 480) argues that prices “lend 
behavioral content to the gravity equation”, which may increase the explanatory power of the 
model. 
 
Relying on the gravity model to analyze international flows of patent applications is not new, 
but neither is it frequent. Table 1 shows that existing research contributions arrive at 
contradicting conclusions regarding the impact of patent fees and geographical distance. 
Whereas Slama (1981) finds that the distance between source and destination country matters, 
Eaton and Kortum (1996) and Eaton et al. (2004) detect only a slight elasticity of patent flows 
with respect to distance. Furthermore, Eaton et al. (2004) show that filing and designation 
fees 10  do matter with respect to the designation decision of applicants, but Park (2003) 
observes an inelastic demand of applicants with respect to filing fees11. 
                                            
9
  F = G*(m1*m2) / r2, where F is the magnitude of the gravitational force effective between the two masses m1 
and m2, which are separated by the distance r; G is the gravitational constant, see http://www.britannica.com/ 
eb/article-61465/gravitation (accessed on May 2nd, 2007). 
10
  Eaton et al. (2004) use EPO filing and designation fees for the years 1990 to 2000.  
11
  The study of Park (2003) includes filing fees for the destination countries. In particular, fees for EPO direct 
filings and EPO filings via PCT as well as national filing fees for the U.S. and Japan are employed for the 
years 1980 to 2000. 
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Study Sample Countries Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Research 
question Main results 
Slama 
(1981) 
national 
patent 
application 
data  
(1967-1978) 
27 countries 
(source 
countries = 
destination 
countries) 
patent flows 
from source 
to destina-
tion country  
• GDP 
• population 
• distance 
• membership in 
economic 
organizations 
(e.g., CMEA, 
EC, EFTA) 
determinants of 
international 
patent 
application 
flows 
• positive GDP-
related elasticity 
• negative 
distance related 
elasticity 
Bosworth 
(1983) 
UK patent 
data (1974) 
1 source 
country 
(UK) 
destination 
countries 
excluding 
UK 
patent flows 
from UK to 
destination 
countries 
• GDP 
• exports 
• activities of 
subsidiaries 
with UK 
parents 
• differences on 
international 
patent laws 
factors 
influencing the 
decision of firms 
to transfer 
technology 
across national 
borders 
• positive GDP-
related elasticity 
• positive 
significant 
impact of 
foreign 
subsidiaries 
• positive export 
related elasticity 
Park 
(2003) 
EPO patent 
application 
data  
(1986-1999) 
30 source 
countries 
and 19 EPO 
destination 
countries 
EP patent 
flows from 
source to 
destination 
country per 
source 
country 
worker 
• GDP 
• distance 
• R&D stocks 
• IP index 
• patent filing 
fees 
extent and 
determinants of 
patenting at the 
EPO 
• positive and 
significant 
impact of R&D 
stock and of the 
strength of 
patent protection 
• demand for EP 
patents is 
inelastic to filing 
fees 
Eaton et 
al. (2004) 
EPO and 
WIPO 
patent data 
and 
simulated 
data  
(1991-2000) 
3 source 
countries 
(EPO, JP 
and US) and 
16 EPO 
destination 
countries 
flow of patent 
applications 
across 
nations 
• GDP 
• distance 
• filing costs 
determinants of 
the decision to 
patent in a 
foreign country  
• only slight 
distance related 
elasticity 
• positive patent 
filing and 
designation fee 
related elasticity 
• increasing 
designation 
propensity over 
time 
 
Table 1: Summary of the literature relying on the gravity model to explain patent flows 
 
An important drawback of the existing research using EP patent data is the fact that it focuses 
on patent filing data, i.e. the authors model the designation decision rather than the validation 
decision. As Eaton et al. (2004) themselves state, after June 30, 1999, as from the 8th 
designated country, designation of each additional country is free of charge. Therefore, after 
1999 most applicants designated the full set of EPC member states (Eaton et al., 2004). 
However, van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebreock (2008) show that whereas the mean number 
of EPC member states increased between 1980 and 2005, the number of validated states 
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remained rather stable. Consequently, using information on designated states might lead to 
biased results with respect to patent flows, especially in the most recent past. Clearly, it is 
preferable to use data on actual validations (or, equivalently, national patent publications 
derived from an EPO patent grant). 
From an economics perspective, it is plausible to assume that the patent protection strategies 
adopted by firms are guided by expectations about the cost/benefit induced by a validation 
and renewal in a country. In that context, the benefits could be expressed in terms of market 
size and wealth, respectively measured by the population of a country and its GDP per capita. 
The distance from the home market to the targeted market must be controlled for, as it may 
have a negative impact. Long distances generally induce additional costs such as translation 
costs and travel expenses. Long distances may also be responsible for higher transportation 
costs for the goods the patent owner wants to export to the target country under patent 
protection.12  
In addition to these traditional factors and in the context of the European patent grant 
procedure, government-imposed transaction costs might play an important role as well. 
Similarly to Bergstrand (1985) for trade flows, we may assume that prices have to be 
accounted for. More precisely, the validation and early renewal fees, and the translation 
required by the EPC member states might considerably affect the geographical distribution of 
patent families. Validation and renewal fees may in a theoretical sense be compared to custom 
tariffs that bias trade flows. 
 
In the following, a gravity model will be used to analyze the validation behavior of countries 
within the geographical area of the EPC. In particular, the determinants of applicants' 
validations across countries are to be examined. To do so, the following basic model (1) is to 
be used: 
                                            
12
  Maskus and Penubarti (1995) provide an empirical insight into the impact of patent systems on trade flows. 
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where  
PAB  =   flows of patent validations between country A and country B 
YA, YB =   GDP per capita of countries A and B, respectively 
NA, NB =   total population of countries A and B, respectively 
DAB =   distance between country A and country B 
FB =   Fees (validation or renewal) and translation requirements in country B 
 
Similarly to Bergstrand (1985), we aim at accounting for relative prices. As explained in 
section 2, three types of fees may be imposed by national patent offices regarding the 
validation of patents granted by the EPO: validation fees, renewal fees and translation costs. 
These three types of costs are incurred to various extents across the EPC member states. 
 
 
 
4 Empirical Implementation and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis relies on patents that were granted by the EPO in the years 1995, 1999, 
and 2003 and that were validated in at least one EPC member state. Patent applications that 
have not yet or have not at all been granted and granted patents, which had not been validated 
in any of the EPC member states, were excluded from the dataset. Overall, the sample 
contains 130,018 patents granted by the EPO and validated in one of the EPC countries. The 
overall sample was divided into three sub-samples according to the grant year. In particular, 
54,429 (40.9%) patents were granted in 2003, 36,271 (27.3%) patents were granted in 1999, 
and 42,318 (31.8%) patents were granted in 1995.  
 
The patent data was extracted from different data sources. The EPASYS database as of 
January 15, 2006 provided filing and grant dates, the country of origin of the applicants, the 
language of the official proceedings at the EPO, and the technical classification of the patent 
application (IPC classes). To construct the validation variable, data on the laps of patents as 
well as information about renewals were needed. Data on the lapse of patents were extracted 
from the EPASYS database as of December 2006 and data on renewal payments were 
received from the EPO post grant system as of December 2006. 
 
)1(lnlnlnlnlnlnln 6543210 εβββββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= BABBABAAB FDNNYYP
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Table A.3 in the appendix presents selected descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables described here after. 
 
Patent validation flows – This variable is defined as the volume of patent validation flows 
between pairs of applicant13 (= source) and validation14 (= destination) countries. Applicant 
countries include non-EPC states such as the USA, Israel, Japan and Korea. In particular, the 
number of patents granted in country A that were validated in country B represent the patent 
validation flow of the country pair AB. Country pairs for which the applicant country is 
concordant with the validation country were dropped from the dataset, since gravity models 
explain flows across countries and not within countries. To construct this variable, a number 
of assumptions had to be made15: (i) it is assumed that if renewal fees had been paid for a 
particular patent in a contracting state, the patent had been initially validated in that particular 
country; (ii) that if a patent lapses in a certain country, this means that the patent had been 
validated in this country. Whenever patents lapsed within 365 days after grant, the patent was 
removed from the dataset, since these patents have to be considered as lapsed ab initio. This 
means that these patents were actually never validated in the respective country. Following 
the advice of an EPO expert, information on patent lapses were preferred over renewal 
information, in case both databases contained conflicting results (this occurred in only 0.66% 
of the cases). 
 
Figure 2 shows the share of EPO granted patents that were validated in each EPC contracting 
states in 1995 and 2003. In 2003, 95% of all patents granted by the EPO were validated in 
Germany (DE), 80% were validated in France (FR), and 75% in the United Kingdom (UK). 
Generally, smaller countries seem to be less attractive (i.e., the share of patents validated is 
smaller than 40%). Furthermore, different trends can be observed, which may be related to the 
age of membership in the EPC. The early members (e.g., The Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES), 
Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Luxembourg (LU), and Austria (AT)) and especially the 
                                            
13
  Applicant countries: Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Switzerland (CH), Germany 
(DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom (UK), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), 
Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Korea (KR), The Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Sweden (SE), USA (US) (selection 
criteria: minimum of 100 patents granted in the three years under consideration, i.e. 1995, 1999 and 2003). 
14
  Validated countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Denmark 
(DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom (UK), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Luxembourg 
(LU), Monaco (MC), The Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Sweden (SE) (IT was excluded due to lack of 
validation data).  
15
  These assumptions are similar to those made in van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008) to analyse the 
evolution of geographical scope and length of renewals of the patents granted by the EPO. 
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United Kingdom (UK), show a downward trend in the share of patents validated in these 
countries between 1995 and 2003. On the other hand, the more recent EPC member states like 
Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE) or Finland (FI) have become more attractive over time. However, 
as the growth in the number of EPO granted patents has been considerable over the past 20 
years, the absolute number of validations per country also has increased over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of granted EP patents validated in EPC contracting states (by grant  
year), 
 
Table A.3 in the appendix shows that the average number of patent validation flows between 
applicant and validation countries amounts to 733, ranging from 1 to 12,454. The average 
number of patent flows is lower in 1995 (683) and the lowest in 1999 (565). These differences 
arise due to the variation in the number of patents in the three sub-samples. 
 
GDP per capita and population - Yearly data on the GDP in current prices (US dollars in 
billions) and the population of the different countries in million persons was obtained from 
the World Economic Outlook Database as of September 2006, which is made available by the 
International Monetary Fund.16 Since Monaco was missing in this database, data from the 
United Nations Statistics Division17 were also used. The estimates for Monaco were prepared 
based on the assumption that the level of GDP per capita is proportional to that of France. The 
GDP per capita is taken as a proxy for the wealth of a country. The population variable is 
used as a proxy for the size of a country. 
                                            
16
  See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx (accessed on April 5, 2007). 
17
  See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp (accessed on April 5, 2007). 
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Whereas the applicant countries exhibit on average 45.5 million inhabitants, the validation 
countries possess less than half as many inhabitants, i.e., their average population amounts to 
19.4 million inhabitants. The difference can be explained by the fact that applicants from 
large non-EU countries, e.g., the USA, Japan or Australia can apply for a patent, but cannot 
be targeted for validation. However, the population does not differ much between the three 
sub-samples. A slight decrease in 2003 is due to the entry of two small countries, i.e. Cyprus 
(entry in 1998) and Finland (entry in 1996), into the EPC. In 2003, the average GDP per 
capita of the countries A (applicant countries) amounts to 1,422.86 billion US dollars. The 
mean GDP per capita of the countries B (validation countries) is much smaller and amounts to 
556.73 billion US dollars. In 1995 and 1999, the mean GDP per capita is almost constant 
(Table A.3).  
 
Distance between capital cities - The distance between the two capital cities in kilometers is 
provided by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Department of Government, University of Essex.18 
Overall, the distance between the two countries amounts to on average 3515 kilometres 
(Table A.3). 
 
EPC membership duration - The average number of years of EPC membership of the 
validation countries (countries B) amounts to 18.3, ranging between 5 and 25 years.19 This 
variable is used to test whether the age of membership would reflect a learning by doing 
practice. As the transfer rate of domestic priority filings to the EPO increases with the 
duration of membership to the EPC (de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2007), one may 
expect that this duration also affects the geographical scope targeted by firms.  
 
Languages - Information on official and spoken languages of European countries was 
provided on the webpage of the "Nations Online Project".20 The language dummy takes the 
value one, if a pair of countries shares a common language and zero, otherwise. 
 
Validation fee – The variable contains the fee a patent holder has to pay in a country to 
validate a patent granted by the EPO.21 Validation fees differ considerably across countries. 
                                            
18
  See http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/capdist.html (accessed on March 30, 2007). 
19
  For the entry of the member countries into the EPC see Table A.1 in the appendix. 
20
  See http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/european_languages.htm (accessed on March 30, 2007). 
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Most of the countries charge a fixed fee. Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Luxembourg 
(LU), Monaco (MC), and the UK do not charge validation fees. Austria (AT), Finland (FI), 
Sweden (SE), Denmark (DK), and Spain (ES) charge an additional page-based fee for patents 
exceeding a certain number of pages (see Table A.2 in the appendix). For these countries, the 
average number of pages per patent was used to compute the total validation fees. 22 The 
average number of pages per patent for EPO applications in 2000 and 2001 was provided by 
the EPO.23 Overall, validation fees were calculated according to formula (2): 
 
)2(SFFF PBFBVB ⋅+=  
where VBF  denotes the validation fee for destination country B and FBF  the fixed validation 
fee for country B. PBF  refers to the page-based fee if charged by country B, otherwise PBF is 
zero. Finally, S  denotes the average number of pages per specification. The value of S was 
set to the actual mean number of 21.24 pages per patent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Validation fee per country and per year in Euro24 (2003) 
 
                                                                                                                                        
21
  Information on validation fees was extracted from the Official Journal and the National Law Relating to the 
EPC. 
22
  Page-based fee in 2003: FI: € 10 p.p. in excess of 4 pages; DK: € 10.80 p.p. in excess of 35 pages; AT: € 25 
p.p. in excess of 5 pages; ES: € 10 p.p. in excess of 22 pages; SE: € 16.86 p.p. in excess of 8 pages. 
23
  Since the number of pages per specification was only available on applicant country basis and not – as 
required – on validation country basis, the mean number of pages per specification over the full set of 
applicant countries was used to calculate the page based fee. 
24
  Exchange rates were obtained from the following internal EPO documents: CA/D 1/03, CA/D 1/99, CA/D 
1/95. 
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As described before, according to National Law Relating to the EPC (p. 95) in case a patent is 
granted in one of the official languages of the country in which the patent should be validated 
no validation action is required, i.e. no validation fee has to be paid. Therefore, information 
about the procedural language was used to correct the validation fee variable for these cases. 
 
The average validation fee for patents granted in 2003 amounts to 135 Euro; ranging between 
0 and 596 Euro (Table A.3). Figure 3 displays validation fees by country in 2003. 
 
Renewal fees – Cumulative national renewal fees for the years 4 to 6 from the date of filing 
of the application at the EPO are used. The patent years 4 to 6 were chosen because it seems 
logical to assume that the fees that are requested during the first years after grant matter most 
for the decision to validate a patent in a particular country. According to Harhoff and Wagner 
(2006) the average grant lag at the EPO has been 4 years. 
 
The renewal fees for the years 4 to 6 amount on average to 278 Euro, ranging between 143 
Euro and 540 Euro. Interestingly, the mean and maximum renewal fee for 1995 is almost 
twice as high as for the other two years (Table A.3). The difference occurs, since - after 1995 
- Switzerland (CH) and The Netherlands (NL) abolished renewal fees of the 4th year. 
Additionally, Finland (FI) and Germany (DE) reduced their yearly renewal fees after 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Renewal fee by country in 2003 in Euro for the years 4 to 6 from the EP 
application date (see table A.2 in the appendix) 
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Figure 4 provides the renewal fees for patents granted in 2003, for each EPC member state. 
Interestingly, United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Switzerland do not charge a renewal fee 
before the 5th year from the EP application date. However, the latter two countries charge 
very high renewal fees for the 5th and the 6th year. Therefore, when comparing the total 
amounts to be paid for the three years, The Netherlands and Switzerland actually request the 
highest renewal fees. 
 
Translation costs - The validated countries are classified in three cost groups according to 
the level of costs of translation incurred by the patent holder. In general, translations into 
Nordic languages are more expensive than translations into languages spoken in central or 
Southern Europe. Therefore, the dummy variable "low translation costs" takes the value 1 for 
Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Portugal (PT), and the Netherlands (NL). The dummy "high 
translation costs" takes the value 1 if the country of validation is Sweden (SE), Denmark 
(DK), or Finland (FI). The third dummy variable "no translation required"25 takes the value 1 
if the validated country is Germany (DE), France (FR), United Kingdom (UK), Austria (AT), 
Switzerland (CH), Belgium (BE), Ireland (IE), Monaco (MC), or Luxembourg (LU). For 
Cyprus (CY) no translation is required as well, since patents have always been validated 
simultaneously in Greece (GR), and the two countries share a common language (see Table 
A.2 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 5 provides the average costs (validation fees and costs plus renewal fees) to be paid to 
validate a patent in a particular contracting state to the EPC and to keep it in force for the 
years 4 to 6 from the filing date at the EPO. Costs were sorted by translation cost groups. 
Austria appears to be the most expensive with respect to the validation and the renewal fee. 
Taking all three cost categories into account, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland) are probably the most expensive due to high translation costs.  
                                            
25
  The translation cost dummies were only factored into a specification using a reduced sample (Table 4). In 
particular, only patents were considered that were validated simultaneously in Germany, France and United 
Kingdom. This restriction was necessary, since otherwise the analysis at the country level prevented from 
taking common languages into account. EP patent applications have to be filed in one of the official 
languages of the EPO, i.e., English, German or French. To validate a patent in a particular country, the 
specification has to be translated into the official language of this country. For validation countries that have 
the language of the official proceedings as their official language(s), no translation is required.  
 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Average costs (validation fees and renewal fees) to be paid to validate a patent  
 in a particular member state of the EPC and to keep it in force for the years 4 to 6  
(patents granted in 2003), costs sorted by translation cost groups. 
 
 
 
The first research question that motivated the present analysis was to assess whether 
validation costs (composed of validation fees, renewal fees, and translation costs) vary 
substantially across countries. Figure 5 all too amply demonstrates that there is indeed a 
strong heterogeneity across countries. Nordic countries seem to be the least attractive 
countries for validation if only fees and translation costs are considered. However, Figure 2 
suggests that this is far from being the case, which means that other factors may also play a 
role, for example, the size of a country and its wealth. This calls for a multivariate analysis, 
which is presented in the next section. 
 
 
 
5 Empirical results  
The 2003 sub-sample provides the basis of the estimates of our first gravity model. 
Subsequently, for the grant years 1999 and 1995, separate gravity models will be provided for 
comparison purposes and in order to test the stability of the parameters. The sub-sample 2003 
is composed of 328 country pairs, the sub-sample 1999 is composed of 308 country pairs, 
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whereas the third sub-sample - including patents granted in 1995 - consists of 284 country 
pairs.26   
 
Table 2 provides the results of the gravity model for the sub-sample 2003, estimated using a 
heteroskedasticty-robust regression analysis. Whereas Models (1) to (3) include country 
specific variables (GDP, population, distance, and the age of EPC membership), Models (4) 
to (6) also include fees, i.e. the validation fee and the renewal fee in the targeted countries B. 
Model (1) shows that the wealth (GDP per capita) of the applicant country A and of the 
validation country B has a positive impact on the validation flows. In particular, a 1% higher 
GDP per capita of the applicant country leads to a 1.7% increase in the patent validation flows 
beyond the national frontiers. A 1% increase in the GDP per capita of the validation country 
results in an increase in validation flows of 0.9%. Finally, an increase in the population of the 
applicant country (validation country) by 10% increases patent validation flows by 8% (3%). 
Overall, these results reveal that the market size and the wealth of the two countries 
substantially impact patent flows. However, these two economic dimensions for applicant 
countries play a larger role than the market size and wealth of the targeted countries. In other 
words, market push forces seem to be stronger than market pull forces.27 
 
Model (2) shows that the distance between the two countries has – as expected - a negative 
and strong effect. An increase in 10% of the distance between the capital cities of two 
countries decreases patent validation flows by 5%.28 Model (3) provides evidence that the 
years of EPC membership of the validation country also have a positive impact on validation 
flows. After including the EPC membership variable, the effect of the wealth of the validation 
country decreases considerably. This is due to the fact that "years of EPC membership" is 
highly correlated with the GDP per capita of country B (corr = 0.4). Therefore, the 
membership variable can be interpreted as a second proxy for the attractiveness of the 
                                            
26
  The deviation in the number of country pairs arises, since the time of entry of the validation countries into the 
EPC had to be taken into account. In particular, validation is only possible for countries which were already 
members of the EPC at the time of application. 
27
  These results are robust to the suppression of non EPC member states. In particular, after excluding Australia, 
Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, and the USA from the applicant countries, the size and the wealth of the source 
countries still matter more with respect to the geographical scope of protection. Therefore, it seems to be not 
the large countries that drive this result. Outcomes are also robust to using a symmetric matrix of source and 
destination countries to estimate the Gravity Model. This means that countries, which were not included as 
applicant countries because not meeting the frontier of 100 granted patents in 1995, 1999, and 2003 (i.e., 
Cyprus, Greece, Luxembourg, Monaco, Portugal), were also excluded from the destination countries. 
28
  Using the variables "common border" or "common language" as alternative distance measures leads to similar 
conclusions. 
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validation country. After all, those countries most interested in granting their own firms 
simple and low-cost access to patent protection in major European export economies would 
have been most interested to join the EPC early. Indeed, Germany, France, UK, Switzerland, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands were the first countries to become members of the EPC in 
1977. Models (4) to (6) confirm that fees do influence the validation behavior of applicants. 
In particular, fees have a negative and significant impact on the geographical scope chosen by 
the applicants. The validation fee elasticity amounts to -0.1 (Model 4), the renewal fee 
elasticity amounts to -0.4 (Model 5). Results stay robust if the sum of both fees is factored 
into the regression (Model 6).  
 
Table 3 contains separate results for the three sampling periods. Model (1) refers to grant year 
1995, Model (2) to grant year 1999, and Model (3) summarizes the results with respect to 
grant year 2003. As already mentioned the deviation in the number of observations is due to a 
later entry of certain countries into the EPC. To test whether differences in the results 
disappear after excluding the later entrants from the sample, Models (2b) and (3b) estimate 
the effects of the explanatory variables only for those country pairs available in 1995. 
Comparing the results of the full sub-samples (Models (2a) and (3a)) with the reduced sub-
samples reveals that excluding later entrants leads to similar coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. An exception is the variable measuring GDP per capita of the validation country in 
2003. The coefficient decreases by 50% after excluding the new entrants, i.e., Finland and 
Cyprus. Moreover, the negative impact of fee variable of the 1999 sub-sample becomes larger 
and more significant after including the new entrants (the impact of fees increases by 40%).  
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  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
dependent variable  
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(GDP per capita of country A) 1.698*** 1.501*** 1.503*** 1.513*** 1.501*** 1.511*** 
  [0.201] [0.169] [0.166] [0.165] [0.166] [0.164] 
log(GDP per capita of country B) 0.935*** 0.630*** 0.262* 0.355** 0.875*** 0.675*** 
  [0.155] [0.132] [0.151] [0.142] [0.164] [0.138] 
log(population of country A) 0.789*** 0.888*** 0.887*** 0.887*** 0.889*** 0.888*** 
  [0.042] [0.039] [0.038] [0.037] [0.038] [0.037] 
log(population of country B) 0.311*** 0.300*** 0.225*** 0.334*** 0.325*** 0.340*** 
  [0.040] [0.036] [0.039] [0.033] [0.034] [0.034] 
log(distance between capital cities)   -0.502*** -0.485*** -0.485*** -0.495*** -0.482*** 
    [0.046] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045] 
log(years of EPC membership of country B)     0.518***       
      [0.124]       
log(validation fees)       -0.099***     
        [0.021]     
log(renewal fees for years 4 to 6)         -0.438***   
          [0.113]   
log(validation fee + renewal fees)           -0.412*** 
            [0.081] 
Constant -6.484*** -1.264 -1.461 -0.245 0.216 0.745 
  [0.940] [0.952] [0.924] [0.952] [0.961] [0.987] 
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328 
F-test (df)  F(4,323)=113.3 F(5,322)=139.0 F(6,321)=126.8 F(6,321)=131.0 F(6,321)=124.2 F(6,321)=131.0 
R-squared 0.590 0.693 0.707 0.851 0.707 0.713 
Robust standard errors in brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
 
Table 2:  Multivariate analysis of patent flows between two countries for 2003 (heteroskedasticty-robust regression, N = 328) 
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  Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (3a) Model (3b) 
  1995 1999 1999 2003 2003 
dependent variable  
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(GDP per capita of  
country A) 2.507*** 2.287*** 2.300*** 1.511*** 1.429*** 
  [0.200] [0.184] [0.171] [0.164] [0.164] 
log(GDP per capita of  
country B) 1.263*** 0.497*** 0.514*** 0.675*** 0.327** 
  [0.133] [0.107] [0.107] [0.138] [0.147] 
log(population of country A) 0.969*** 0.892*** 0.893*** 0.888*** 0.896*** 
  [0.042] [0.039] [0.034] [0.037] [0.037] 
log(population of country B) 0.471*** 0.317*** 0.302*** 0.340*** 0.288*** 
  [0.028] [0.026] [0.025] [0.034] [0.033] 
log(distance between capital 
cities) -0.446*** -0.458*** -0.428*** -0.482*** -0.446*** 
  [0.053] [0.042] [0.038] [0.045] [0.043] 
log(validation fee + renewal 
fees) -0.215** -0.521*** -0.315*** -0.412*** -0.377*** 
  [0.098] [0.081] [0.069] [0.081] [0.085] 
Constant -6.494*** -0.796 -2.209** 0.745 1.870* 
  [1.103] [0.987] [0.892] [0.987] [0.964] 
Observations 283 308 283 328 283 
F-test (df)  
F(6,276)= 
169.4 
F(6,301)= 
146.2 
F(6,276)= 
192.0 
F(6,321)= 
131.0 
F(6,276)= 
127.8 
R-squared 0.792 0.770 0.810 0.713 0.703 
Robust standard errors in brackets / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 3:  Multivariate analysis of patent flows between two countries for 1995, 1999, 
and 2003 (heteroskedasticty-robust regression) 
 
 
 
Overall, our results show that the wealth of the two countries becomes less important over 
time. This effect occurs despite of the fact that the difference in wealth of the countries, 
included in the analysis, does not dissipate over time. Patent protection appears to have 
become more important even in the less wealthy countries. Given the global impact of TRIPS, 
this is not completely surprising. The effect of the size of the two countries as well as the 
distance between the capital cities stays rather constant over time. Conversely, the impact of 
fees (sum of validation and renewal fee) becomes increasingly important over time. A 
possible explanation for this outcome is that due to an increasing number of member states, 
applicants have to choose among an increasing number of validation countries. Given that the 
applicants may not have more resources at their disposal (most firms have relatively inelastic 
budgets for patent filing), they may face an increasingly difficult trade-off over time. It is 
consistent with this view that the cost elasticity has increased over time. 
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Table 4 provides results of OLS regressions, also taking translation costs into account. To 
avoid biased results, only patents were considered that had been validated in Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom. This leads to a reduction of the overall sample from 130,018 patents 
to 91,515 patents. This restriction had to be made since estimating the determinants of the 
validation behaviour at the country level prevents us from taking common languages into 
account. EP patent applications have to be filed in one of the official languages of the EPO, 
i.e., English, German or French. To validate a patent, the specification has to be translated 
into the official language of the validation country. In case, the official language of the 
validation country is concordant with one of the three official languages at the EPO, no 
translation is required. Assume, for instance, that the EP application was filed in German. 
Consequently, no translation would be required to validate the granted patent in Germany, 
Austria, and Switzerland. By using only patents validated in Germany, France and United 
Kingdom, we assumed that translations into the three languages German, French, and English 
had already been available. Therefore, translation costs for all German, English, or French 
speaking countries could be set to zero. It is evident from these comments that the variability 
of our translation cost variable is somewhat limited and that one should not expect very 
precise estimates of the respective coefficients, given the measurement error problems. 
 
Comparing the outcomes of Table 4 with those using the full sub-sample 2003 (Table 2) 
reveals that the results do not change with respect to the size and the sign of the coefficients 
or their significance. Validation and renewal fees still have a negative impact on the 
validation behaviour (Models 5 to 7). The “high-cost translation” dummy is associated with a 
negative and significant parameter when alone included in the model. The “low-cost 
translation” dummy is also negative but is not significant at the 10% level. The significant 
effect of “expensive translations” however disappears after including validation and renewal 
fees in the regression (Model 7). The lack of significance of the translation cost dummies in 
Model (7) may be caused by the fact that it is not possible to include actual translation costs 
for the different EPC member states, since translation costs vary considerably across different 
translation bureaus or law firms. Thus, our results provide first empirical evidence of an 
impact of translation costs. However, additional evidence is needed, possibly at the patent 
level, to obtain a more precise assessment of their impact. 
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  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
dependent variable  
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(validation 
flows) 
log(GDP per capita of country A) 1.716*** 1.535*** 1.537*** 1.535*** 1.545*** 1.534*** 1.543*** 
  [0.192] [0.163] [0.161] [0.163] [0.160] [0.160] [0.160] 
log(GDP per capita of country B) 0.894*** 0.613*** 0.273* 0.608*** 0.384*** 0.853*** 0.651*** 
  [0.151] [0.128] [0.147] [0.171] [0.136] [0.158] [0.174] 
log(population of country A) 0.781*** 0.872*** 0.871*** 0.873*** 0.872*** 0.874*** 0.872*** 
  [0.040] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036] 
log(population of country B) 0.320*** 0.310*** 0.241*** 0.318*** 0.341*** 0.335*** 0.347*** 
  [0.037] [0.033] [0.036] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
log(distance between capital cities)   -0.464*** -0.448*** -0.457*** -0.449*** -0.457*** -0.446*** 
    [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] 
log(years of EPC membership of 
country B)     0.479***         
      [0.120]         
reference group: no translation needed               
expensive translation (dummy)       -0.394***     -0.093 
        [0.109]     [0.129] 
low-cost translation (dummy)       -0.157     -0.07 
        [0.141]     [0.141] 
log(validation fees)         -0.089***     
          [0.020]     
log(renewal fees for years 4 to 6)           -0.429***   
            [0.110]   
log(validation fee + renewal fees)             -0.346*** 
              [0.094] 
Constant -6.655*** -1.829** -2.012** -1.776* -0.983 -0.38 -0.136 
  [0.901] [0.887] [0.864] [0.968] [0.886] [0.904] [1.012] 
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 
F-test (df)  F(4,323)=125.1 F(5,322)=141.1 F(6,321)=128.1 F(7,320)=110.8 F(6,321)=130.8 F(6,321)=126.8 F(8,319)=101.8 
R-squared 0.612 0.702 0.715 0.711 0.718 0.716 0.722 
Robust standard errors in brackets        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
 
Table 4:  Multivariate analysis of patent flows between two countries for 2003, patents that were validated simultaneously in DE, FR, UK 
(heteroskedasticty-robust regression, N = 328) 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this paper was twofold. First, it was to assess to what extent validation fees, 
renewal fees and translation costs vary across the EPC member states. Second, it was to 
evaluate whether these fees/cost do affect the validation behaviour of applicants once the 
patent is granted by the EPO.  
 
The statistical analysis clearly indicates that validation fees, early renewal fees (years 4 to 6) 
and translation costs substantially vary across countries. Nordic countries, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Austria have the highest combinations of fees/cost within the EPC 
boundaries.  
 
The quantitative analysis provided interesting results as well. First, the major factors affecting 
the validation behavior of countries are the size (number of inhabitants) and the wealth (GDP 
per capita) of both the applicant countries and the targeted countries. However, it clearly 
appears that the size and wealth of the applicant country play a more important role than the 
economic characteristics of the targeted countries. Additionally, distance and the age of EPC 
membership of the destination country are important factors that need to be controlled for to 
understand the patent flows within the EPC member states. 
 
Validation and renewal fees have a substantial negative impact on the validation behavior of 
applicants, in addition to the aforementioned factors. These results suggest that the current 
fragmented market for technology in Europe has important implications for innovators. The 
implementation of the community patent, regularly debated by European policymakers over 
the past 30 years, would clearly substantially reduce the cost of enforcing a patent in Europe 
once it is granted, and definitely influence the applicants' behavior in that matter. 
 
Translation costs, which could only be approximated through dummy variables, also have an 
impact on validations, but this impact disappears when fees are included in the model. These 
fees are much better measured, as data on them are publicly available. We may assume 
relatively safely that translation costs, should they be easy to measure, also play an important 
role. Therefore, the nearly implemented London Protocol, which will reduce the translation 
requirements, and hence the translation costs, will lead to further growth in the demand for 
patent validations in each national patent office. Given that applicants appear to file many 
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marginal applications in these days (see van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck, 2008), the 
impact of the London Protocol may be a mixed blessing. 
 
Future research may better clarify the relative role of the various factors accounted for in the 
aggregated model presented in this paper. A first improvement would be to confirm these 
results at the patent level. This would allow us to have a more detailed approximation of 
applicants’ behavior, but also to take into account the role of the technological specialization 
that applicants may have developed. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 
Members of the EPC as of March 2007 
 
Date of entry 
into the EPC Country 
Date of entry 
into the EPC Country 
Oct 7, 1977 Belgium, Germany, 
France, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands,  
Switzerland, United 
Kingdom 
Apr 1, 1998 Cyprus  
 
May 1, 1978 Sweden Nov 1, 2000 Turkey 
Dec 1, 1978 Italy Jul 1, 2002 Bulgaria, Czech Republ., 
Estonia, Slovakia 
May 1, 1979 Austria Dec 1, 2002 Slovenia 
Apr 1, 1980 Liechtenstein Jan 1, 2003 Hungary  
Oct 1, 1986 Greece, Spain Mar 1, 2003 Romania  
Jan 1, 1990 Denmark Mar 1, 2004 Poland  
Dec 1, 1991 Monaco  Nov 1, 2004 Iceland 
Jan 1, 1992 Portugal Dec 1, 2004 Lithuania  
Aug 1, 1992 Ireland  Jul 1, 2005 Latvia  
Mar 1, 1996 Finland Mar 1, 2007 Malta 
Source: European Patent Office (see http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html). 
 
Table A.2 
Validation fees, early renewal fees and translation costs for the year 2003 
 
validation fee [Euro] Renewal fee [Euro] Country 
    fix     page-based (pages free)   year 4   year 5  year 6 
Translation 
costs 
[Dummy] 
Austria 116 25 (5) 94 101 138 n.t.r.* 
Belgium 0 - 45 60 75 n.t.r. 
Switzerland 0 - 0 270 270 n.t.r. 
Cyprus 87 - 52 70 87 n.t.r. 
Germany 150 - 70 90 130 n.t.r. 
Denmark 148 11 (35) 148 169 189 high 
Spain 245 10 (22) 25 48 71 low 
Finland 85 10 (4) 125 140 165 high 
France 35 - 25 25 135 n.t.r. 
United Kingdom 0 - 0 72 101 n.t.r. 
Greece 299 - 46 54 70 low 
Ireland 35 - 90 114 134 n.t.r. 
Luxembourg 0 - 37 47 59 n.t.r. 
Monaco 0 - 31 50 70 n.t.r. 
The Netherlands 25 - 0 242 279 low 
Portugal 91 - 41 53 59 low 
Sweden 120 17 (8) 76 98 120 high 
* n.t.r. = no translation required
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Table A.3  
Descriptive statistics (patents granted in 1995, 1999 and 2003) 
 
 2003 (N = 328) 1999 (N = 308) 1995 (N = 284) 
  mean std. dev. min max mean std. dev. min max mean std. dev. min max 
validation flows from country A 
to country B 733.02 1616.01 1 12454 564.68 1263.38 1 8822 683.07 1597.53 1 9771 
GDP per capita of country A 1422.86 2453.48 115.26 10960.75 1226.92 2133.77 96.83 9268.43 1193.08 1896.67 67.24 7397.65 
GDP per capita of country B 556.73 713.47 1.00 2444.28 478.74 611.55 0.79 2146.43 523.63 682.06 0.83 2524.95 
population of country A  
(mio. inhabitants) 45.50 65.92 3.98 291 44.42 63.66 3.74 279.2 43.43 61.67 3.6 266.46 
population of country B  
(mio. inhabitants) 19.37 24.43 0.03 82.52 20.21 24.41 0.03 82.09 21.25 24.78 0.03 81.66 
distance between capital cities 3515.20 4079.14 136 18044 3454.8 4113.88 136 18044 3333.18 4052.14 136 18044 
years of EPC membership of 
country B 18.34 7.34 5 25 15.2 6.71 3 21 12.18 6.05 2 17 
validation fees 138.93 164.78 0 596.25 150.48 176.96 0 596.53 137.64 177.12 0 596.36 
renewal fees for years 4 to 6 278.25 137.83 143 540 272.52 130.68 138.05 525.61 473.29 341.83 228 1681 
 
 
